IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
Plaintiff,)
-VS-) No. 13-CR-04-GKF
TARRAN ARNEL BRINSON,)
Defendant.	3

TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GREGORY K. FRIZZELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NOVEMBER 6, 2013

REPORTED BY: BRIAN P. NEIL, RMR-CRR
United States Court Reporter

2 APPEARANCES 1 2 3 Danny C. Williams, U.S. Attorney, Trent Shores and 4 **Clint Johnson.** Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 110 West Seventh Street, Suite 300, Tulsa, Oklahóma, 74119, 5 attorneys on behalf of the Plaintiff; 6 Patrick M. Megaro, Attorney at Law, Brownstone Law Firm, 400 North New York Avenue, Suite 215, Winter Park, Florida, 32789, attorney on behalf of the 7 Defendant; 8 Stephen P. Gray, Attorney at Law, Gray & 9 Associates, 3101 North Hemlock Circle, Suite 112, Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, 74012, attorney on behalf of 10 the Defendant; Allen M. Smallwood, Attorney at Law, 1310 South 11 Denver Avenue, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74119, attorney on behalf of the Defendant. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

timely fashion? 1 2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Secondly, have you had a full, 3 THE COURT: fair, and complete opportunity to discuss the contents 4 5 of that revised presentence investigation report with 6 your attorneys? 7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are there any issues? I know 8 there is one objection here as to the revised 9 10 presentence report. 11 MR. MEGARO: Your Honor, I have put my objection in writing. It's the two-level enhancement 12 13 for obstruction. Other than that, there was an error 14 in my sentencing memorandum which I would like to 15 correct at this time. THE COURT: Please, if you would. 16 17 MR. MEGARO: I believe it's paragraph 47. I mistakenly included a one-level reduction for 18 19 acceptance of responsibility. I believe that was a 20 typographical error, that should not be included, and I would withdraw that at this time. 21 22 THE COURT: All right. In other words, 23 withdraw the entire paragraph? 24 MR. MEGARO: Thank you. 25 THE COURT: Is that correct?

MR. MEGARO: Before I speak too soon, I apologize, let me just triple-check.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. MEGARO: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let me revise then my response to that.

All right. Any formal response from the government with regard to the objection?

MR. JOHNSON: The objections, Your Honor, just the government stands on its sentencing memorandum and what we laid forth in there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. As to that objection, the court notes for the record that in a letter to the probation office dated August 26th, 2013, and in defendant's sentencing memorandum at docket No. 123, the defendant stated one outstanding objection to that revised presentence report.

enhancement for obstruction of justice in paragraph 27. The defendant argues that he was found guilty of a single count of obstruction of justice and it has been considered in the base offense level calculation. He contends that it is double-counted as a specific offense characteristic, which is impermissible because

United States Sentencing Guideline Section 3C1.1 has fully accounted for the harm.

The defendant argues that double-counting is not permissible where the same conduct on the part of the defendant is used to support separate increases under separate enhancement provisions which necessarily overlap, are indistinct, and serve identical purposes, citing *United States v. Rucker*, 178 F.3d 1369, at page 1371, a Tenth Circuit decision from 1999.

Subsequently, the defendant objects to the -- I'm sorry. That's the one that was just stricken so I will take that out as well.

This is actually kind of an interesting little issue, if you like sentencing guidelines, and it's fairly involved if one gets down into the weeds. Pursuant to sentencing guideline Section 3C1.1 comment at note 8, and sentencing guideline Section 3D1.2(c), because the defendant is convicted of an obstruction offense, as well as the offense with respect to which the obstructive conduct occurred, the offenses are to be grouped together and the greater of the offense level for the obstruction offense or the offense level for the underlying offense with a two-level obstruction enhancement shall be used.

The court references the parties to *United*

States v. Provenzano, 1 Fed.Appx. 43, also 2001 WL 15609, a Second Circuit decision from 2001, which upheld the use of the higher of the obstruction calculation or the calculation for the underlying offense increased by the two-level adjustment for obstruction pursuant to sentencing guidelines Section 3C1.1, comment.(n.8), for a defendant convicted of both an obstruction offense and the underlying offense.

Ordinarily, it's necessary to determine the offense level for the obstruction offense and the underlying offense separately to ascertain the count with the highest offense level. However, in this case, as the obstruction offense and the underlying offense group and both offenses are calculated under the Section 2G1.3 guideline, a separate determination for the offense level for the obstruction count was not necessary. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 3D1.3, comment.(n.2).

However, if the obstruction count were calculated separately, the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice would not be applicable, nor would the enhancement based upon defendant being convicted under Title 18, United States Code Section 1591(b)(2) or the six levels of enhancements for other

specific offense characteristics applicable to the underlying offense.

The offense level for the obstruction count in itself is only 24. Therefore, the offense level for the underlying offense grouped together of 38 is accurately -- excuse me -- the offense level for the underlying offense of 38 prevails as accurately reflected in the presentence report.

Clear as mud; right? But it's an interesting sentencing guideline issue that comes up when you group these offenses together.

Now, that objection having been overruled, any other objections before the court states its findings with regard to the sentencing guidelines?

MR. JOHNSON: Not from the United States, Your Honor.

MR. MEGARO: Nothing that I haven't already briefed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. The total offense level here, and the court finds, is 39. Mr. Brinson's criminal history category is an I. The term of custody under the statute under Count 1 is any number of years to life. Under the sentencing guidelines, the term of custody for Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 is 262 months to 327 months. The term of custody as to

Counts 2, 4, and 5 under the statute is not less than 10 years or life -- or to life per count.

As to Count 3, the term of custody under the statute is not more than five years. The guidelines provide for a term of custody for Count 3 of 60 months. I take it that's up to 60 months or is that a mandatory minimum?

PROBATION OFFICER: That's the maximum, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So that's up to 60 months.

As to Count 6, the statute provides for a term of custody of not more than twenty years. As to Count 6, the guidelines provides for a term of custody of up to 240 months.

(Discussion held off the record)

THE COURT: All right. One correction.

I'm told that the guideline sentence as to Count 3 is
60 months and not up to 60 months.

The term of supervised release under the statute for Count 1 is not more than five years. Under the guidelines, the term of supervised release ranges from two to five years. Under the statute, the term of supervised release on Counts 2, 4, and 5 is not less than five years to life per count. Under the

sentencing guidelines, the term of supervised release as to Counts 2, 4, and 5 is five years to life per count. The term of supervised release as to Counts 3 and 6 under the statute is not more than three years per count. Under the sentencing guidelines, the term of supervised release for Counts 3 and 6 ranges from one to three years per count.

As to probation, under the statute, the defendant is ineligible and the same holds true under the guidelines.

The fine under the statute is not more than \$250,000 per count as to Counts 1 through 6. The fine under the guidelines ranges from \$25,000 to \$250,000. Restitution in this case is the sum of \$740. The special assessment under both the statute and the guidelines is \$100 per count on each of the six counts of conviction for a total of \$600.

Now, are there any objections?

MR. JOHNSON: Not from the United States, Your Honor.

MR. MEGARO: Again, Your Honor, just what I briefed earlier. Other than that, no.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Megaro, the court would be pleased to hear any arguments you have on behalf of Mr. Brinson, sir.

MR. MEGARO: Certainly. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. MEGARO: Your Honor, first, I would like to acknowledge the presence of my client's family and his parents and his brother who are here. These people have submitted letters of recommendation on his behalf. They have been extraordinarily helpful in helping me do my job, and I would like to thank them at this time for being there to support their son and brother.

Judge, I look at my client. He's just a child himself. I've read many, many, many medical journals, psychological journals in which studies have been conducted about maturity in young males. And one after another a lot of studies that I've read over the years have indicated that the male mind does not fully mature until somewhere around 26 to 27 years of age. There's varying numbers but generally speaking it's in the late 20s.

My client is still a child himself, and as with most children an immature mind is unable to comprehend the full nature of consequences of their actions.

When you combine an immaturity -- a mental immaturity with drug abuse, even as something that might seem as

benign as marijuana, I think we all know and we all recognize that drugs tend to rob a person of the powers of intellect and reason. When you combine that with an immature mind, you have a situation where a young man does not fully appreciate the consequences of his actions.

Here, Your Honor, I see a young man, a family man, who had a future. He has very strong parents, very strong loving family. I think back on the last ten years of my life and everything that has happened in the last ten years and a lot has happened.

Certainly I'm not the same person I was ten years ago.

I try to frame this in the context of where would I be if the last ten years of my life had simply not occurred? I try to imagine myself if I were incarcerated for ten years and try to imagine who I would be if life had stopped for me in 2003 and I had stopped developing, I had stopped maturing as a person, I had stopped all of the things in my life.

And when I consider ten years as a 23-year-old man, this is -- forgive my lack of math -- but this is approximately 40 percent of this young man's life. A ten-year minimum here would take 40 percent of this young man's life and simply put it on hold. If he were given a ten-year minimum sentence in this case,

which is what I'm asking the court to do, he would still be able to come out, be released from the Bureau of Prisons, and still be able to lead a productive life.

I recognize the guidelines calculation here and the numbers are relatively frightening from this point of view. I understand that Congress has put certain mandatory minimums on some of the crimes for which Mr. Brinson has committed -- or has been found guilty of rather. I recognize that Congress has put a lot of stock in the guidelines. But sometimes, as the Supreme Court has noted, the guidelines simply do not match the offender or the offense.

Judge, this young man comes from a really good family. I would hate to see a future completely and totally thrown away. I think a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence is enough to accomplish all of the penological goals of 3553. I think it's enough to punish this young man by taking 40 percent of his life lived so far. I think it's enough to send a message to him that this type of conduct should not be tolerated. It's enough to send a message to others in the community that this type of conduct carries with it severe ramifications. And it's enough to -- it's no more than necessary to accomplish all of these

other -- these goals that I've just outlined.

Other than that, Your Honor, I have extensively briefed Mr. Brinson's background and the fact that mitigating factors, a lack of aggravating factors that I believe are applicable in this case. I won't belabor the court with repeating everything ad nauseam that I've submitted in my sentencing memorandum.

But apparently a lot of people believe in this young man and I believe in this young man, and I do believe if given the chance he will not come back before this court in the future. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Mr. Brinson, the court would be pleased to hear any statements you have on your own behalf, sir.

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I have no statements, my lawyer said everything, so --

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Mr. Johnson.

MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, as this court is well aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding this case as Your Honor presided over the six-day trial, examined the documentary evidence, and heard the witnesses' testimony, I will not belabor or recount the voluminous evidence in this case but I would rather highlight a few areas for the court's consideration.

First and foremost, this is a child sex-trafficking case. Mr. Brinson was the chief executive officer, he was the chief financial officer, and the president of his own child sex-trafficking business. He preyed upon one of the most vulnerable segments of our society, minor children.

Whether these young girls were running away from something or whether they were running to something, the defendant, as this court heard, promised them love, affection, attention, and material items, he induced and he enticed, he persuaded and he cajoled. He convinced minor children to perform commercial sex acts so that he could live the lifestyle of a pimp, to be a player in the game.

The tools he used, Your Honor, were marijuana, material items, shoes, and his charm. Mr. Brinson not only recruited, but he solicited, transported, harbored, advertised, and marketed these children for his own financial gain. All they had to do to acquire and retain Mr. Brinson's affection was to have sex with adult men and then make sure Mr. Brinson got the money that they had acquired in their commercial sex acts.

He had full knowledge of his actions. And as this court is well aware, not only did he use minors

as prostitutes, he used other minors to help him recruit minor prostitutes. He then used social media and the Internet to build and maintain and sustain his business.

And even after Mr. Brinson was arrested for his deplorable conduct, his criminal activities weren't complete. As this court is well aware, and the jury convicted Mr. Brinson of, he attempted to subvert the very criminal justice process that we're here today. He contacted and attempted to have a Grand Jury witness to not testify or to either testify falsely before that Grand Jury. He was doing everything he could to cover his tracks. No remorse, no regret.

The United States asks this court to send a strong message to Mr. Brinson and any other individuals that somehow believe it is either moral or legal to have minor children perform sex acts for adult men for their own profit. This court has the opportunity to send that message today.

The guidelines have been correctly calculated. Congress has spoken on this issue. The use of minor children for sexual exploitation is not now, nor will it ever be, acceptable.

To a few of the defense's arguments in their sentencing memorandum, it is true that while the

defendant used marijuana and supplied marijuana to minor children, he did not traffic in marijuana and drugs in the conventional sense. However, he trafficked in something even worse, he trafficked in 14- and 15-year-old girls.

The defense has asked you to think what would happen to Mr. Brinson for the next ten years, how that would affect him if he was given a mandatory minimum sentence. I would like to ask the court to think what would happen to the three minor children in this case, specifically C.H. and A.H., what would have happened to them over the next ten years if Mr. Brinson hasn't preyed on them and prostituted them out for his own financial gain.

Your Honor, the United States asks this court to --

THE COURT: Well, now wait. A.H. was not prostituted out.

MR. JOHNSON: C.H. was and A.H. was attempted to be prostituted out, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. JOHNSON: We would ask the court to send an appropriate message in this case, a message that a guideline sentence in this case is appropriate, and send a message of deterrence.

Thank you, sir.

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THE COURT: The court will note that it has received, in conjunction with the defendant's sentencing memorandum, the letters that Mr. Megaro referenced from family of Mr. Brinson.

Is there anything further before the court states the sentence?

MR. MEGARO: No, Your Honor.

MR. JOHNSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The court has reviewed the defendant's sentencing memorandum at docket No. 123, wherein the defendant requests an eight-level downward variance to a total sentence of 120 months, the mandatory minimum. The defendant cites various factors in support of his variance request to include growing up in a poor single-parent home with an absent father during a portion of his childhood, that his crimes did not involve acts of or threats of violence or distribution of narcotics, his lack of criminal history, that a harsh sentence to promote deterrence to others is ineffective, that he will be imprisoned for ten years at a minimum; and further, protection for the public is not necessary, that he is unlikely to re-offend, and that excessive imprisonment would be counterproductive and hinder his ability to maintain

existing familial relationships.

The court has also reviewed the government's response to the defendant's sentencing memorandum at docket No. 124, wherein the government opposes the defendant's request for variance and requests a sentence within the applicable guideline range. The court finds that many of the factors cited by the defendant are not extraordinary to the extent that they warrant a variance.

However, based upon the totality of the factors in this case, to include the defendant's age, his lack of criminal history, and the specific facts of the offenses in this case, the court finds that a sentence of 262 to 327 months is greater than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing promulgated in Title 18 United States Code Section 3553(a).

In particular, the court references the factors set forth in subsections 2(a), the need to provide just punishment for the offenses; 2(b), the need to afford adequate deterrence; and 6, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.

In two similarly charged and relatively recent Tenth Circuit cases, each involving multiple teenage

victims who are violently forced and/or threatened with death to act as prostitutes, the defendants received sentences less than the low end of the applicable guideline range in this case.

The court references *United States v. Wild*, 143
Fed.Appx. 938, 2005 WL 1840172, a Tenth Circuit case
from 2005, upholding three concurrent 120-month
sentences where the defendant took three females, ages
14 to 16, across state lines and forced them to
prostitute themselves with threats of death and
withholding of food and shelter; and *United States v.*Sutherland, 191 Fed.Appx. 727, 2006 WL 2328752, a
Tenth Circuit case from 2006, which upheld a
240-sentence where the defendant forced three minor
females, two of whom who were under 16, to work as
prostitutes by use of violence and threats.

Therefore, the court finds that there are factors in this case that separate the defendant from the mine run of similarly-situated defendants in similar cases. The court bears in mind that in addition to the conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of children, as referenced by the government, the jury found the defendant here guilty in Count 6 of obstruction of justice.

Accordingly, the defendant's motion for variance

contained in his sentencing memorandum at docket

No. 12 is granted in part and denied in part and the

court will vary downward three levels to an offense

level of 36. Combined with the defendant's criminal

history category of I, the variance guideline range of

imprisonment is 188 to 235 months.

The court recognizes that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory and are not
mandatory, but has considered the sentencing
guidelines, along with all of the factors set forth in
Title 18, United States Code Section 3553(a), to reach
an appropriate and reasonable sentence in this case.
In determining a sentence, this court has considered
the nature of the offenses and the defendant's
criminal history and his personal characteristics.

This case involved the defendant acting as the pimp of one 14-year-old female, date of birth November 29, 1997, by marketing sexual services to be performed by the minor victim on Web sites, negotiating prices for the victim's services, providing transportation and hotel rooms for the victim to meet customers to perform sexual acts, and retaining a portion of the profits made by the victims.

Further, the defendant attempted to recruit the 16-year-old sister of the victim into his prostitution

business. In addition, the defendant utilized a 17-year-old female to aid him in recruiting females to work as prostitutes and obstructed the administration of justice by directing another party not to appear to testify against him before a Grand Jury despite her having been subpoenaed to appear.

The defendant's young age, his minimal criminal history, and abundant familial support are mitigating factors. The court has afforded equal weight to the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide for just punishment.

Based upon the aforementioned factors, a sentence toward the middle of the guideline range will result in a sentence that is sufficient, but is not greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of sentencing mandated by Congress, including adequate deterrence for this defendant and to others and protection of the public.

A significant term of supervised release is appropriate based upon the nature of the offenses and will allow the defendant time to reintegrate into the community upon release from imprisonment to obtain any additional substance abuse treatment and vocational training as needed and to be monitored for future law

violations.

Sentencing disparities among defendants were considered in determining an appropriate sentence in this case and restitution is mandatory.

Mr. Brinson, if you'll rise, please. In accordance with applicable law, this court hereby imposes the following sentence:

It is the order and judgment of this court that the defendant, Tarran Arnel Brinson, is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of 204 months. The sentence shall consist of 204 months as to each of Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and 60 months as to Count 3, said counts to run concurrently, each with the other.

The court recommends that the defendant be placed in a facility as close to Tulsa, Oklahoma, as possible, where he may obtain vocational training and will allow him the opportunity to be treated in the Bureau of Prisons' residential substance abuse treatment program.

The defendant shall pay restitution in the total amount of \$740 to victim C.H. as listed in paragraph 66 of the presentence report to which there's been no objection. And as authority for the amount of restitution in this case, which is determined by the

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amount collected, see *United States v. Robinson*, 508 Fed. Appx. 867, at pages 870 through 871; also 2013 WL 150181 (11th Cir. 2013).

Based upon the defendant's financial profile as outlined in the presentence report, the court finds that the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine, and therefore, no fine will be imposed.

Now, any monetary penalty is due in full immediately but is payable on a schedule of the greater of \$25 quarterly or 50 percent of income received from any source while imprisoned, to include income pursuant to the federal Bureau of Prisons' inmate financial responsibility program if the defendant voluntary participates in that program. Ιf a monetary balance remains, payment is to commence no later than 60 days following release from imprisonment to a term of supervised release in equal monthly payments of \$100, or 10 percent of net income; that is, his take-home pay, whichever is greater, over the duration of the term of supervised release and thereafter as prescribed by law for as long as some debt remains. Not withstanding establishment of a payment schedule, nothing shall prohibit the United States from executing or levying upon property of the defendant discovered before or after the date of this

judgment. Interest on the restitution will be waived.

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on a term of supervised release for a period of five years as to Count 1, ten years per count as to each of Counts 2, 4, and 5, and three years as to each of Counts 3 and 6. Said terms of supervised release shall run concurrently, each with the other, for a total term of ten years. Should those terms of supervised release be revoked, an additional term of imprisonment of up to five years as to Count 1 and two years per count as to Counts 3 and 6 could be imposed at each revocation.

As to Counts 2, 4, and 5, if the defendant commits any criminal offense under Chapter 109A, 110, or 117, or Section 1201 or 1591 for which a term of imprisonment longer than one year can be imposed, the court shall revoke the supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment of not less than five years. Upon revocation for other reasons, the term of imprisonment shall not exceed five years at each revocation.

Immediately upon release from confinement, but in no event later than 72 hours thereafter, the defendant shall report in person to the probation office in the district to which he is released. While

on supervised release, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime.

The defendant shall comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Title 42 United States Code Section 16901, et seq., as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency of a state in which he resides, works, is a student, or was convicted of a qualifying offense.

The defendant is prohibited from possessing a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon.

The defendant shall, at the direction of the United States probation officer, cooperate with and submit to the collection of a DNA sample for submission to the combined DNA index system.

Further, the defendant shall not unlawfully use or possess a controlled substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least two periodic drug tests within 120 days for use of a controlled substance. That's all to say that when you're released, a probation officer or an office will keep track and take drug tests to make sure you're staying away from drugs.

The defendant shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court and shall comply with the following additional special conditions:

Number one, the special search and seizure condition; number two, the special substance abuse treatment and testing condition; number three, the special sex offender conditions; number four, the special financial conditions; and number five, the special workforce development condition.

It is further ordered that a \$100 special monetary assessment per count of conviction for a total of \$600 be paid immediately to the United States Court Clerk for the Northern District of Oklahoma.

Now, Mr. Brinson, as I'm sure you've been advised because you have appellate lawyers sitting next to you, I have a duty to advise you that you have a right to appeal your conviction and your sentence. Do you understand, sir, that any such appeal must be filed within 14 days of the date the judgment is entered?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And further, if you wish to appeal and you cannot afford an appeal, do you understand, sir, that there are forms in the court

clerk's office to request to appeal in forma pauperis? 1 2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I believe we have three 3 preceding indictments to dismiss? 4 5 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor. We so move 6 at this time. THE COURT: Upon the oral motion of the 7 government, the original, the superseding, and the 8 second superseding indictments are dismissed. 9 10 Is there anything further here? 11 MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, you mentioned 12 taking care of Mr. Smallwood's motion. 13 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you very much for 14 reminding me. I take it there is no objection to the motions? 15 MR. JOHNSON: Not from the United States, 16 17 Your Honor. THE COURT: Clearly, the application to 18 19 withdraw as attorney of record at document No. 125 is 20 granted. Mr. Smallwood asked to withdraw after sentencing. That having been completed, document 21 No. 125, the motion to withdraw as attorney of record, 22 23 is granted. 24 Now, as to the second motion, request for 25 substitution of counsel, I was just procedurally

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interested, Mr. Smallwood -- that's docket No. 26 -insofar as the Brownstone Law Firm has already entered an appearance pro hac vice, is it necessary that a request for substitution of counsel be granted? MR. SMALLWOOD: Probably not, Judge. Ι just did that out of an abundance of caution to make sure the court --THE COURT: Well, belt and suspenders are not to be scoffed at, as we all know. So although I don't know that it's necessary, I take it there's no objection? MR. MEGARO: No. Your Honor. Our firm has been hired to do the appeal. THE COURT: Yes. MR. MEGARO: So we will file the notice of appeal and prosecute the appeal through the Tenth Circuit. THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Smallwood's request for substitution of counsel at document No. 26 is granted out of an abundance of caution. Is there anything further here? MR. JOHNSON: Not from the United States, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, it's very clear to this court, Mr. Brinson, that you have a great deal of

ability and I just ask that you use this to turn your life around. I think everyone here understands the raw ability that you have. Whatever happens on your appeal, this is an opportunity for you to take this and make something positive out of it and certainly hope you do that.

We are adjourned.

(The proceedings were concluded)

CERTIFICATE

case.

I, Brian P. Neil, a Certified Court Reporter for the Northern District of Oklahoma, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes and is a true record of the proceedings held in above-captioned

I further certify that I am not employed by or related to any party to this action by blood or marriage and that I am in no way interested in the outcome of this matter.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of December 2013.

s/ Brian P. Neil

Brian P. Neil, RMR-CRR United States Court Reporter